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R E S U LT S
Key Points
· Many social programs have a gap between the 
number of individuals eligible for services and the 
number enrolled.
· The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation imple-
mented Covering Kids & Families to increase 
enrollment in Medicaid and the State Children’s 
Health Insurance Program.
· Grantees sought to increase enrollment by raising 
awareness among low-income families, simplifying 
the application process, and coordinating among 
programs.
· Funders are encouraged to consider the life-
cycle of programs and organizations, the skills in 
coalition-building and working with public officials 
that are needed, and the need to fit political strate-
gies with the local culture.
Introduction
Being eligible for social programs does not 
necessarily translate into receiving social ser-
vices and/or financial support. Many of those 
eligible for such benefits as food stamps or 
public health insurance are not enrolled in the 
programs that distribute them (Selden, Hudson, 
& Banthin, 2004;  Leftin & Wolkwitz, 2009). 
Among other reasons, those eligible may not be 
aware of the program, or they may be daunted 
by the complexities associated with enrollment. 
From 1999 through 2007, the Robert Wood 
Johnson Foundation (RWJF) sought to bridge 
the gap between eligibility and enrollment 
in Medicaid and the State Children’s Health 
Insurance Program (SCHIP) through two major 
national programs: the Covering Kids Initiative 
(CKI) and its successor, Covering Kids & Fami-
lies (CKF). This article will explore the lessons 
that can be drawn from RWJF’s experience – 
lessons that can be useful to other foundations 
interested in reducing the gap between eligibil-
ity and enrollment in public programs and in so 
doing, ameliorating social problems by ex-
tending the reach of existing programs. These 
lessons relate to program design, site selection, 
program longevity, and the use of evaluation to 
help improve program operations. The lessons 
are drawn from the CKF evaluation undertaken 
by a team of researchers from Mathematica 
Policy Research, the Urban Institute, and 
Health Management Associates.1
Background: The CKF Program
Access to health care for children is largely 
determined by whether or not they have health 
insurance coverage (Schwartz, Howard, Williams, 
& Cook, 2009). The lack of health insurance 
holds significant risks for children. Compared to 
children with health insurance, those without are 
less likely to have a medical home, less likely to 
see a physician or dentist for standard preventive 
care, and more likely to postpone needed care 
1 Additional analyses from the evaluation can be found at 
www.rwjf.org
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CKF grantees focused on 
maximizing the enrollment and 
retention of children and parents 
through the use of three strategies: 
outreach, simplification, and 
coordination.
(Schwartz et al., 2009).
To address the large and growing number of un-
insured children in the 1990s, Congress enacted 
SCHIP in 1997 (Rosenbach, 2007). This coverage 
initiative gave states the ability to expand cover-
age and also to make innovations in coverage pro-
grams (Wooldridge, 2007). To capitalize on this 
opportunity, in 1997 RWJF began an ambitious, 
decade-long effort to increase the health insur-
ance coverage of low-income children nationwide 
(Wooldridge, Ellis, Hill, Stevens, & Trenholm, 
2010). First, RWJF implemented CKI in 1999, 
which provided support to state and local organi-
zations aiming to increase enrollment of children 
in Medicaid and SCHIP (Wooldridge et al., 2010). 
The RWJF board originally intended CKI to focus 
only on Medicaid eligibility, as SCHIP had not yet 
been legislated when CKI was authorized in July 
2007. However, given the excitement generated by 
SCHIP and the chance to help SCHIP avoid the 
mistakes of Medicaid, CKI was expanded to focus 
on both Medicaid and SCHIP (RWJF, 2005).2 
The Covering Kids Initiative increased Medicaid 
and SCHIP enrollment and also began changing 
the culture of many public health insurance pro-
grams, making them more consumer friendly and 
less stigmatizing (RWJF, 2001). In 2002, based on 
research that showed that offering coverage to 
parents increased enrollment of eligible children, 
RWJF expanded the program to include parents 
and changed the name to Covering Kids & Fami-
lies. The program’s goals also were broadened 
to include not only the enrollment but also the 
retention of children and their parents on public 
insurance rolls. From 2002 to 2007, RWJF distrib-
uted $44 million in CKF grants to organizations 
in 46 states to support efforts toward increasing 
the numbers of children and parents enrolled in 
SCHIP and Medicaid (Wooldridge et al., 2010). 
On average, state CKF grantees received $830,000 
(Paxton, Wooldridge, and Stockdale, 2005).  Dif-
2 In addition, CKI was originally intended to fund 15 state 
projects; by 1998, RWJF had received applications from 44 
states and the District of Columbia. In July 1998, the board 
tripled funding for the program, from an original $13 mil-
lion allocation to $43 million, meaning that not only could 
it focus on SCHIP and Medicaid, but also, every state that 
applied could participate (RWJF, 2005). 
ferent types of organizations were chosen as state 
grantees: half were advocacy groups, often with 
previous Medicaid or SCHIP experience; about a 
third were social services or health care resource 
agencies; seven were state government agencies, 
usually the Medicaid or SCHIP agency in the 
state; four were universities; and two were provid-
ers (Paxton, Wooldridge and Stockdale, 2005). 
State grantees were required to distribute half of 
their funds to at least two local CKF grantees; in 
all, there were 113 local grantees. Local grantees 
were established in each state to test new strate-
gies to target and enroll eligible individuals and 
to identify barriers at the local level (Paxton et al., 
2005). Local grantees included advocacy groups 
(20 percent), health care and social services 
resource agencies (20 percent), providers (20 per-
cent), community services groups (15 percent), 
county or city government agencies (10 percent), 
health outreach or education groups (10 percent), 
universities or school districts (4 percent), and 
health insurers (2 percent) (Paxton, Wooldridge 
and Stockdale, 2005).3 The program was managed 
by the Southern Institute on Children and Fami-
lies, a public policy nonprofit organization based 
in Columbia, SC.
CKF grantees focused on maximizing the en-
rollment and retention of children and parents 
through the use of three strategies: (1) outreach 
to low-income groups to increase their aware-
ness of their eligibility for public health insurance 
programs, (2) simplification of the state rules gov-
erning eligibility and retention in those programs, 
3 Actual grant amounts were tied to state population and 
percentage of uninsured children in the state.
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and (3) coordination between Medicaid and 
SCHIP and among eligibility categories within 
each state program.
Outreach was initially the strategy most actively 
employed by CKF grantees. Here, CKF organized 
outreach campaigns intended to raise low-income 
families’ awareness that their children (and in 
some cases the parents themselves) might be 
eligible for Medicaid and SCHIP benefits and to 
provide information on how to apply for those 
benefits (Grant & Ravenell, 2002). One popular 
form of outreach was a call to action announc-
ing a resource, such as a toll-free hotline, that 
eligible families could contact for more informa-
tion about health insurance coverage. Another 
was application or renewal assistance, either by 
phone or in person, in a variety of locations (for 
example, schools) where income-eligible children 
and parents might be (Howell & Courtot, 2005). 
A third form of outreach consisted of specialized 
activities to reach target populations that were 
subject to low literacy levels, language barriers, 
frequent changes of address, or other challenges.
Simplification was the second major strategy. It 
consisted of efforts to work with state agencies 
to simplify SCHIP and Medicaid policies and 
procedures in order to make it easier for fami-
lies to enroll – and then stay enrolled – in these 
programs (Grant & Ravenell, 2002). Examples of 
simplification activities included: making applica-
tions shorter, reducing the applications’ docu-
mentation requirements, and allowing mail-in 
renewal applications.
Establishing formal coordination between SCHIP 
and Medicaid programs was the third strategy. 
Coordination was intended to ensure that families 
could transition easily between programs if they 
applied for the wrong program or their eligibil-
ity changed (Grant & Ravenell, 2002). Examples 
of coordination activities included creating one 
application for both Medicaid and SCHIP and 
instituting processes that simultaneously assessed 
eligibility for both programs. 
RWJF used various tactics to pursue these strate-
gies:
CKF grantees were asked to enlist and main-1. 
tain the cooperation of state Medicaid and 
SCHIP officials. Without that cooperation, 
the simplification and coordination strategies 
would not have been feasible.
Grantees were asked to form a statewide 2. 
coalition that included not only state officials 
but also child-health advocacy groups, com-
munity-based organizations, health plans, 
providers, schools, and others (Ellis, Stevens, 
& Tang, 2003; Hoag & Stevens, 2008).4 These 
coalitions were meant to serve as the com-
mon space for the development of consensus 
on the problem and the solutions, as well as 
serving as a channel for informing and possi-
bly influencing policymakers. Local grantees 
also formed coalitions at the local level.
Selected CKF projects were trained in the 3. 
use of process-improvement collaboratives 
(PICs). Grantees formed teams that included 
key Medicaid and SCHIP staff, such as 
eligibility processors or other field staff, who 
agreed to work with CKF and one another to 
improve Medicaid and SCHIP processes.5
RWJF created an extensive “Back to School” 4. 
communications campaign to inform families 
that they might be eligible for public health 
coverage and to encourage parents getting 
their children ready for school to think about 
enrolling them in Medicaid or SCHIP (Stock-
4 RWJF hoped that coalitions would not only support CKF’s 
work on the three strategies during the grant period but 
would also help build “lasting capacity in states and com-
munities to continue progress toward the initiative’s objec-
tives even after the funding period” (RWJF, 2001).
5 The role of PICs in the CKF program will be described in 
more detail below.
Simplification consisted of efforts to 
work with state agencies to simplify 
SCHIP and Medicaid policies 
and procedures in order to make 
it easier for families to enroll – 
and then stay enrolled – in these 
programs.
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dale, Howell, & Hill, 2004).
Finally, RWJF provided CKF grantees with 5. 
technical assistance, including consulting 
services on producing effective communica-
tions campaigns, simplification, sustainabili-
ty, and other specialized topics from a variety 
of consultants. 
Evaluation Methodology
The CKF evaluation was based on a logic model 
that included the three CKF strategies, the likely 
environmental influences on the program, and 
the questions RWJF wanted answered, as shown 
in Figure 1. Evaluators sought to answer several 
key questions:
What did CKF grantees do?1. 
How did the environment affect achievement 2. 
of program goals?
Did CKF change knowledge about or at-3. 
titudes toward Medicaid and SCHIP?
What happened to health insurance cover-4. 
age?
What factors governed changes in enroll-5. 
ment and retention?
What role did CKF play in such changes?6. 
Has CKF survived beyond the end of RWJF 7. 
funding?
The broad scope of these questions, combined 
with the program’s breadth, required an innova-
tive evaluation design using multiple methods. 
Data were collected through a set of Web and 
telephone surveys, site visits, reverse site vis-
its, process observations, analyses of program 
reports, and statistical analyses of state-level 
enrollment data.
First, in order to meet the needs of not only the 
evaluation but also foundation staff, the national 
program office, and the communications con-
tractor, the evaluation team designed an online 
grantee reporting system. This system provided 
information on the membership of grantee 
coalitions, their site-specific strategies, and their 
specific program activities. This reporting system 
formed a common database that minimized the 
burden on the grantees and served as the basis for 
formative feedback provided to the foundation 
through “highlight memos” reporting on various 
aspects of CKF operations.
 
  
FIGURE 1 
LOGIC MODEL FOR EVALUATING COVERING KIDS & FAMILIES (CKF) 
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FIGURE 1 Logic Model for Evaluating Covering Kids & Families (CKF)
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Second, to understand the workings of the coali-
tions, the interactions of CKF staff and coalitions 
with relevant state officials, and the barriers to 
the successful implementation of CKF strategies, 
the evaluation team fielded Web and telephone 
surveys of CKF program directors, coalition 
members, state officials, and CKF grantee staff. 
Many of these were repeated several times during 
the course of the program.
Third, in-person meetings with grantees and state 
staff took place during site visits to 10 states in 
the course of intense case studies. The implemen-
tation component of the evaluation consisted of 
two “reverse site visits” in which the grantees and 
the evaluation team met for structured discus-
sions of specific topics, such as strategies to im-
prove retention. Finally, the Centers for Medicaid 
& Medicare Services (CMS) provided access 
to Medicaid and SCHIP enrollment data in the 
Medicaid Statistical Information System (MSIS).
Our summative evaluation synthesized descrip-
tive analyses of enrollment data, surveys, site-visit 
interviews, documents, and data from the online 
reporting system. Central to this synthesis were 
the case studies of 10 CKF states that discussed 
the trends in new enrollment and retention of 
children in Medicaid and SCHIP from 1999 
through 2005. The analysis focused on the linkage 
of these trends to major policy changes, especially 
those associated with the CKF grantees’ activi-
ties. Ideally, we would have examined such links 
through a formal impact analysis estimating the 
effect of individual policy changes on the number 
of children enrolling or remaining in Medicaid 
or SCHIP. However, because the CKF program 
was implemented nationwide simultaneously, we 
could not use control or comparison groups to 
assess the program’s effects on coverage. Instead, 
we addressed the challenge of attributing causal-
ity by a rigorous synthesis of information across a 
variety of sources in a case study approach, which 
combined exploratory data analysis and in-depth 
interviews with key informants. To this we added 
the analysis of SCHIP enrollment data found in 
MSIS to analyze the effect of CKF activities on 
enrollment in Medicaid and SCHIP. This com-
bined approach allowed us to assess the potential 
influence that policy changes had on new enroll-
ments and retention. In addition, we compared 
data across sites to assess the strength of the 
patterns in promising policies and procedures for 
increased enrollment and higher retention rates.
Results of the Evaluation: Lessons 
Learned From CKF
The results of the evaluation that may be useful to 
other foundations are best presented within the 
framework of the program’s life cycle. Program 
activities are likely to vary depending on whether 
a program is just beginning or is coming to the 
end of its funding. A program’s life cycle includes 
three stages: (1) startup, as the underlying idea 
for the program is developed, the program’s 
strategies are set, and the grantees are selected 
and begin implementation; (2) maturity, when 
the grantees have organized themselves and 
are steadily implementing their plans to reach 
program goals; and (3) perpetuation or program 
death, when the end of foundation funding is near 
and grantees need to prepare for life after the 
grant, either by securing continued funding, re-
inventing themselves while continuing to pursue 
program goals, or preparing to terminate their 
operations (Stevens & Hoag, 2008).6 Foundations, 
technical-assistance providers, and evaluators 
need to match their activities to the appropriate 
stage of the program’s life cycle.  
6 Funders could help grantees in this stage by establishing 
new organizations that help grantees continue their work 
even after funding ends. RWJF continued information 
sharing through a national CKF network, run by state CKF 
grantees, to sustain their knowledge base (Hoag & Stevens, 
2008).
A program’s life cycle includes 
three stages: startup, maturity, and 
perpetuation or program death, 
when the end of foundation funding 
is near and grantees need to 
prepare for life after the grant. 
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RWJF needed to assess whether 
potential grantees had ongoing 
connections to the state officials 
relevant to program concerns 
and/or a history of collaboration 
between the state government 
and community groups, skills 
in coalition building, and the 
capacity to sustain operations after 
foundation funding ended.
We turn now to explore the lessons that can be 
drawn from the experience of the CKF program 
in its various stages. These lessons are divided 
into two sections. The first discusses how pro-
grams can be structured to effectively pursue the 
goal of enrolling and retaining target populations 
in social-benefits programs. The second explores 
how evaluations can be designed so that they 
provide information that foundations can use to 
improve such programs.
Program Lessons for Funders
Program startup
Assessing the capacity of applicants to alter 1. 
state policies and procedures is critical to 
implementation in this type of program; 
applicants that cannot demonstrate these 
specific capacities should not be awarded 
grants. 
Potential grantees need a broad set of skills. For 
CKF, applicants needed two major skill sets: (1) 
organizing educational and media campaigns for 
outreach, and (2) working collaboratively with 
officials of state health insurance agencies to 
improve SCHIP and Medicaid policies and proce-
dures. Specifically, RWJF needed to assess wheth-
er potential grantees had ongoing connections to 
the state officials relevant to program concerns 
and/or a history of collaboration between the 
state government and community groups, skills 
in coalition building, and the capacity to sustain 
operations after foundation funding ended.7
One of the most critical skills is the ability to 
build and sustain coalitions. Coalitions are crucial 
to the success of programs like CKF that are 
trying to change state policies or procedures. By 
their very nature, they represent numerous out-
7 Only some of the criteria we suggest were used in the 
original CKF funding decisions, because the above list was 
derived from the lessons learned after the CKF program 
was implemented. To choose CKF sites, the foundation 
considered whether the site had accomplished some 
change (such as mobilizing in a crisis) during the previous 
version of CKF (the Covering Kids Initiative), whether the 
site had a strong working coalition that had taken some 
action on an issue, and whether the site was likely to be 
able to raise funds to sustain activities after the foundation 
funding ended.
lets for education and outreach. They provide di-
rect ties to organizations that work with the often 
difficult-to-reach low-income and communities 
of color. They also consolidate political pressure 
on the state government through joint activities 
of many local organizations. The skills needed to 
recruit a variety of different types of stakeholders, 
facilitate useful discussions, maintain the par-
ticipation of different types of organizations with 
differing agendas, and generate consensus are 
not necessarily part of the skill set of all project 
staff. Some CKF coalition members, for example, 
complained that project staff (that is, grantee 
employees) insisted on maintaining control over 
the activities of the coalition to such a degree that 
participation declined and CKF program goals 
were only partially attained.
Furthermore, the skills that help coalition 
members be productive participants are not 
necessarily held by all. Some CKF coalitions were 
composed of members that were unaware of who 
made decisions for the coalition. Twenty-two 
percent of respondents to a survey of CKF coali-
tion members reported that they only attended 
coalition meetings because it was part of their job 
(Ellis & Stevens, 2003). Grantees therefore need 
some technical assistance to teach them how to 
create and maintain strong coalitions. For CKF, 
Stevens, Hoag, and Wooldridge
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In some states, there is a rift 
between community-based 
organizations (CBOs) and state 
agencies, with CBOs seen as 
advocates that make demands 
on government. The design of the 
CKF program, with its emphasis 
on coalitions, was a better fit with 
those states that had cooperative 
cultures.
the national program office provided training 
in building and sustaining coalitions through a 
series of workshops. Training included fostering 
leadership, developing coordinating committees, 
learning processes to develop priorities, conduct-
ing resource inventories, and conflict resolution 
in order to strengthen the basic source of action 
in the program. CKF grantees without such skills 
had some problems working effectively toward 
program goals. In one state, for example, the state 
Medicaid and SCHIP official reported in a 2005 
interview that while the CKF grantee was doing a 
good job at outreach, CKF had had no influence 
on policy changes in the state because the coali-
tion was poorly run.
These experiences suggest that if the applica-
tion review process reveals otherwise promis-
ing applicants that do not possess needed skills, 
the funder either should award funding to other 
applicants that do possess these skills or should 
offer the applicants training to help overcome the 
skills limitations that might hinder their effective-
ness. Program development at RWJF after CKF 
reflects this lesson; the foundation later used this 
as a consideration when screening state-level 
advocacy coalitions as grantees for its Consumer 
Voices for Coverage (CVC) program.
National-scale programs for national-level 2. 
problems are not automatically the most 
suitable strategy.
The designers of CKF chose to fund 46 state sites 
in the hope that the large scope of the program 
would raise the visibility of the problem of the 
eligible-but-uninsured and garner support for 
CKF’s solution. With this decision, the foundation 
locked itself into spreading program resources 
across both the states that had the capacity and 
the drive to achieve CKF goals and the states that 
had less capacity and perhaps less motivation to 
do so. This design committed CKF to one side of 
the perennial debate between targeting resources 
only to grantees that have the capacity to succeed 
versus providing all possible grantees with the 
opportunity to make progress on the issue. Some 
observers of CKF argued that resources were 
spread too thin, and in some cases provided to 
those that could not effectively use their grants. 
The CKF program ultimately mitigated this issue 
by limiting access to certain program services, 
such as training for the process improvement col-
laboratives, to those sites that could demonstrate 
solid progress.
Program strategies intended to influence 3. 
public policies should fit the local political 
culture.
Political cultures of states differ (Elazar, 1984). 
Some states have predominantly cooperative 
political cultures in which stakeholders work 
together, form a consensus, and then move 
together to address an issue. Other states have 
predominantly competitive political cultures in 
which stakeholders compete with one another for 
state funding or the attention of state officials. In 
some states, there is a rift between community-
based organizations (CBOs) and state agencies, 
with CBOs seen as advocates that make demands 
on government. The design of the CKF program, 
with its emphasis on coalitions, was a better fit 
with those states that had cooperative cultures. In 
these states it often was easier for CKF coalitions 
to draw state health officials into active roles in 
the coalition because CKF fit a familiar pattern. In 
contrast, CKF coalitions in states with competi-
tive political cultures sometimes had a more dif-
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ficult time establishing strong relationships with 
state officials. Several state CKF grantees encoun-
tered state officials who rarely interacted with 
the CKF coalition; a few others faced numerous 
policy and personnel changes that compounded 
the gap.
Funders need to assess whether their program 
model would be likely to succeed in all environ-
ments. Coalition-based strategies, such as those 
used by CKF, may be better attuned to a coopera-
tive political culture. In states where the political 
culture has historically been more conflict-ori-
ented, a social-change model or strategy based on 
the use of advocacy groups pressuring the state 
government to generate change may be a more 
effective approach to influence state policies and 
procedures. Alternatively, the program strategies 
could be diversified to increase the probabilities 
of success in varied environments.
Incorporating local-level activities into a 4. 
CKF-like program allows for grassroots 
information to be transmitted to the relevant 
state agencies. Foundations interested in 
influencing state policies and procedures 
should consider funding local-level grantees 
to serve this purpose.
Programs that seek to affect government policies 
benefit from funding grantees on more than one 
governmental level. The CKF program achieved 
greater influence because it funded both local- 
and state-level grantees. Local CKF coalitions 
provided crucial information and possible solu-
tions to CKF challenges. Several local grantees 
developed and tested new formats for enrolling 
eligible applicants, and one tested whether emer-
gency rooms would be an appropriate enrollment 
setting. Several of these new enrollment formats 
were subsequently considered and, in a few cases, 
implemented by the state.
In other instances, local grantees functioned as 
early-warning systems for the state programs. 
Many local grantees gathered information on 
the actual workings of state enrollment efforts 
on the local level and fed back information on 
bureaucratic roadblocks or inconsistencies to the 
state coalition. State officials in the coalition then 
took that information to their agency colleagues. 
In several cases, the states changed policies in 
response to that information. In one state, for ex-
ample, local grantees helped determine that each 
county operated differently in terms of applica-
tion requirements. Working through the coali-
tion with state officials, workers in all counties 
were retrained so that application requirements 
were uniformly applied. Funders should consider 
providing generous funding for such local grants 
at the beginning of the program, so that they can 
collect such critical information at the stage in 
the program when program strategies can still be 
easily adjusted.
Program maturity
Funders working on programs to influence 1. 
government procedures should build mecha-
nisms into the program that allow grantees 
to adjust to inevitable electoral and budget 
cycles that affect state governments.
CKF program developers and managers found 
that grantees often needed to reallocate their 
resources from one task (such as outreach) to 
another (such as retention) because of a change 
in circumstances – for example, the changes in 
the governing party after an election or changes 
in funding for the SCHIP or Medicaid agencies 
because of budget crises or other financial events. 
In 2003, for example, most CKF grantees encoun-
tered forces that made it difficult to continue to 
emphasize outreach as a means to enrolling low-
income children in public insurance programs. 
That year, state budgets were under stress due 
to an economic downturn. States were unable to 
contribute resources to outreach campaigns. They 
were also restricting eligibility requirements to 
reduce the cost of the insurance programs. Grant-
ees, in turn, were worried that outreach cam-
paigns would only generate demand for insurance 
that would not be provided.
In this situation, the CKF national program office 
relied on the fact that the program had several 
strategies rather than just one. They recom-
mended that the grantees consider switching 
Stevens, Hoag, and Wooldridge
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their focus to one of the other ways of addressing 
coverage. For example, one CKF grantee that had 
initially planned to focus on outreach shifted to 
retention when the state froze new SCHIP enroll-
ment. They realized it was critical to help current 
enrollees remain enrolled, since new enrollment 
was curtailed by the freeze; if a beneficiary did not 
retain enrollment, he or she could not get back 
into the program. In short, CKF built flexibility 
into its program through the inclusion of several 
strategies and multiple tactics.
Foundation-funded programs that are 2. 
intended to change government policies or 
procedures should take actions to become a 
resource for relevant government officials. 
Otherwise, the cost of collaboration to the 
state will outweigh the benefits.
The majority of CKF state grants – 39 out of 46 
– went to non-state agencies, typically advocacy 
or social services resource groups (Paxton et al., 
2005).8 Thus, the majority of grantees were not 
insiders, but rather outsiders who had to win the 
cooperation of state officials. The grantees had to 
provide some incentive to state agencies in order 
to gain their full collaboration, given the workload 
and slim resources available to most state govern-
ments.
The CKF program built support from state of-
ficials in a number of ways. One tactic was to 
undertake activities that helped the state stretch 
its program operations beyond its own funding. 
A number of CKF states undertook much of the 
outreach activities for state governments during 
periods where either political disagreements or 
economic downturns reduced state budgets for 
outreach for SCHIP. This allowed the states to 
place their own resources elsewhere. Another tac-
tic used by grantees was to develop streamlined 
applications, web-based enrollment modules, or 
outreach materials for special populations and 
provide them to the state without charge. For 
example, in one state, the CKF grantee paid to 
have outreach materials developed and printed in 
different languages.
8 Seven state CKF grantees were located within state agen-
cies. 
The most effective tactic that led states to see 
CKF grantees as useful was the establishment of 
process improvement collaboratives.  PICs were 
teams composed of different stakeholders brought 
together to diagnose problems in systems and to 
then devise changes in system processes to im-
prove operations. The teams engaged in the “plan, 
do, study, act” (PDSA) model of testing changes: 
planning a process change, implementing the 
change on a small scale, observing the measurable 
results, and acting on what is learned, either by 
starting another PDSA cycle or adopting success-
ful processes in widespread practice (Institute for 
Healthcare Improvement, 2003). The PICs turned 
CKF grantees into allies of state and local officials 
as CKF members worked in teams with officials 
to identify and resolve problems with the enroll-
ment and renewal processes, rather than acting as 
advocacy groups pressuring the state for change. 
This strategy is likely to be quite useful for 
funders in states that possess competitive political 
cultures. PICs can help grantees bridge the gap 
that exists between themselves and state officials. 
For example, one PIC developed a plan to align 
Medicaid and food-stamp program renewal dates 
in order to reduce the number of times families 
would have to apply for renewal of their benefits 
(Hoag & Wooldridge, 2007). In another state, the 
CKF grantee had often been at odds with the state 
over Medicaid and SCHIP processes; by working 
together, they streamlined the process from 72 
to 16 steps, decreasing the average application-
processing time from 22 to three days and saving 
$28,500 per month in overtime costs. These 
findings are similar to other studies that have 
documented the value collaborative participants 
have found in working together to solve common 
problems (Gold, Krissik, & Mittler, 2006).
Program perpetuation or program death
Funders should develop practices for grant-1. 
ees to use to help them maintain the gains 
that they have made during the program.
Foundation programs rarely last indefinitely. Usu-
ally, grant funding ends and the foundation moves 
on to fund efforts that address other social prob-
lems. Given this typical funding, funders should 
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develop practices that support the progress that 
grantees have made. Funders can encourage 
grantees to institutionalize the gains they have 
made; they can embed these gains within the 
practices of a member or a stakeholder organiza-
tion or within a set of public regulations. In the 
CKF program, the foundation and its national 
program office encouraged grantees to embed 
outreach activities within the regular operations 
of a variety of settings: schools, doctors’ offices, 
clinics, and social services agencies, among oth-
ers. This helped ensure that outreach for public 
health insurance programs would continue to be 
conducted in the locations where routine interac-
tions with potentially eligible families took place.
The simplification and coordination strategies of 
CKF were naturally suited to preserving gains. 
CKF grantees focused on ways in which states 
could change their own internal processes to in-
stitutionalize practices that helped to continually 
address enrollment and retention. For example, 
one grantee persuaded state officials to accept a 
forwarding address from the U.S. Postal Service 
as a valid new address (Hoag & Wooldridge, 
2007). Two others began accepting renewals by 
phone. Another CKF grantee worked closely with 
the state to create a prepopulated renewal form; 
enrollees only needed to send the form back if the 
prepopulated information was incorrect (Uzoi-
gwe & Hoag, 2008). State officials validated the 
role CKF played in making lasting simplification 
and coordination improvements. In interviews 
in 2005, state officials reported that there were 
86 simplification or coordination changes that 
CKF had influenced; in 2008, these same officials 
reported that 86 percent of these 86 changes were 
still in effect (Duchon & Ellis, 2009).
Funders should encourage grantees to plan 2. 
for sustainability, although not all grantees 
need to sustain their activities.
Not all program activities can be embedded in the 
ongoing operations of stakeholder organizations 
or in regulations. Nor can all grantees arrange 
to institutionalize all of their activities within a 
program’s time frame. If foundations would like 
to have a lasting return on their investment, they 
will need to encourage grantees to maintain their 
activities after foundation funding ends. Given 
its long funding history, RWJF realized the need 
for CKF grantees to explicitly plan for sustain-
ability in their post-funding future. They therefore 
required state grantees to raise funds to match 50 
percent of the grant amount by the third year of 
their four-year grants. They also provided techni-
cal assistance to grantees on how to do fundrais-
ing (Hoag & Stevens, 2008). Those grantees that 
had organized themselves specifically to win 
funding from CKF were particularly in need of 
such training, because they had no experience in 
post-grant situations. More mature (pre-existing) 
grantees were less likely to need such training, 
because they had already demonstrated a capacity 
for survival.
But funders need to set reasonable expectations 
about sustainability; not all grantees need to 
survive in the post-grant world, nor will all be 
able to survive. Those grantees that experienced 
difficulties during the CKF grant – such as having 
weak coalitions, little support from state officials, 
or no in-kind or financial support from the com-
munity – reported having more trouble surviving 
when the foundation support ended. During the 
CKF grant, one grantee experienced numerous 
personnel and policy changes that included a 
switch in both the agency determining eligibility 
and the agency conducting intake and application 
processing. Moreover, local philanthropic support 
was minimal. Not surprisingly, this grantee was 
Those grantees that experienced 
difficulties during the CKF grant – 
such as having weak coalitions, little 
support from state officials, or no 
in-kind or financial support from 
the community – reported having 
more trouble surviving when the 
foundation support ended.
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not able to find support to continue beyond the 
grant. Even some CKF grantees considered “suc-
cessful” (as measured by the policy and proce-
dural changes they implemented) were sometimes 
not able to survive. One such grantee closed at 
the end of RWJF funding; according to a former 
staff member, finding funds to sustain the work 
proved too difficult when the state and national 
economies were in decline.
Evaluation Lessons for Funders 
During the life cycle of a program, funders, 
grantees, and technical-assistance providers need 
different types of information from the program 
evaluation. Even prior to program startup, evalu-
ations can be useful. They can be used to explore 
the characteristics of proposed sites to assess 
their suitability for the program. Funders can also 
use evaluations to produce formative feedback 
that will help the foundation adjust the design 
of the program (for example, by shifting tactics) 
and help the grantees adjust program strategies 
to fit site-specific circumstances. Evaluations 
can also produce evidence that identifies factors 
that might increase the likelihood of success, 
thereby helping funders to set some priorities 
among possible program activities. Evaluators 
should organize data-collection systems early on 
so that grantees know what data they will need to 
contribute and are able to plan for data collec-
tion. Establishing data-collection systems in the 
startup phase also communicates to the grantees 
how their progress will be measured and assessed.
For a program’s mature phase, evaluations can 
provide formative feedback to further adjust 
strategies and can be a vehicle for the identifica-
tion of best (or most promising) practices.
In the last stage of a program, evaluations can 
offer summative conclusions that give an overall 
assessment of the effects of the program, includ-
ing its impacts. Summative evaluations can also 
provide funders with lessons for future programs 
by incorporating the lessons from current pro-
grams (as this article attempts to do). Below, we 
discuss the evaluation lessons that apply to these 
three program stages, with examples from the 
CKF evaluation.
Rigorous, redundant, multiple methods and 1. 
data sources are crucial for assessing out-
comes when comparison group designs are 
not possible.
For CKF, with its grantees in 46 states, and for 
many similar programs, there are no feasible 
comparison groups. Even in state- or locally 
focused programs, good comparison states or 
localities are rare. It is difficult to match cases 
exactly, given the complexity of trying to effect 
changes in enrollment and retention in differ-
ent state governments and with different state 
programs (states establish their own rules for 
their Medicaid and SCHIP programs, mak-
ing each one unique). In such situations, gold-
standard randomized treatment-control studies 
are not possible; creative approaches to analyz-
ing and synthesizing data are required. When 
RWJF wanted to know how its program affected 
policy and outcomes but no comparison group 
was conceivable, we used multiple methods to 
identify the factors that influenced outcomes. We 
collected data from respondents with different 
perspectives, including grantees, state officials, 
and other stakeholders; and we collected informa-
tion over time to see what had changed. We also 
used intensive case studies that combined quali-
tative data and quantitative methods to assess 
the alignment of enrollment change with policy 
change and program interventions, across states 
and across time, as a way of validating the prob-
ability that an outcome was due to specific policy 
changes that CKF had influenced.
The quick turnaround of highlight memos 2. 
and issue briefs proved to be an effective way 
of disseminating information to stakeholders 
early enough in the process that they could 
adjust their behavior.
Formative feedback from an evaluation allows for 
information to reach funders in a timely way. The 
CKF evaluation generated such real-time data by 
producing a series of highlight memos and issue 
briefs that supplied information on what was oc-
curring in the CKF states and identified promis-
ing practices in time for them to be disseminated 
throughout the program. For example, early on, 
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the evaluation reported on promising outreach 
practices at a time when state budgets were 
tightening; another early report focused on part-
nership with schools and providers as a way to 
institutionalize outreach among other key com-
munity members. Still another highlight memo 
provided RWJF with information on the types of 
organizations joining the CKF coalitions and the 
intensity of their participation (Ellis & Stevens, 
2003; Ellis, Stevens, & Tang, 2003). Later, the 
evaluation reported on key elements needed for 
successful outreach (Wooldridge, 2007) as well 
as effective and ineffective CKF activities (Hoag, 
Stockdale, Courtot, Ellis, & Gaber, 2004). The 
foundation and its national program office ad-
justed several aspects of the program in response 
to this evaluation feedback. For example, grantees 
responded to evaluation reports about the lack 
of effectiveness and efficiency of doing outreach 
through health fairs, instead pursuing other av-
enues of outreach like working with school nurses 
and with school-based free/reduced price lunch 
program to identify potentially eligible children 
and families.
Evaluations of a program can be a stepping- 3. 
stone for future programs as the funder gath-
ers information about what works and what 
does not, as well as which questions can be 
answered and which cannot.
Foundations can use evaluation data to develop 
other programs that focus on the same or similar 
goals. RWJF developed several new programs 
to address coverage using the CKF evaluation 
results. The foundation’s Consumer Voices for 
Coverage program is designed to strengthen state 
consumer-health advocacy networks in twelve 
states so that the consumer voice can be heard in 
current debates over health reform. The founda-
tion considered the capacity of CVC applicants to 
build coalitions as part of their funding criteria; 
this specific criterion was based on evaluation 
findings from the CKF evaluation. Similarly, the 
Maximizing Enrollment for Kids project funds 
grantees working to increase the enrollment and 
retention of eligible children in public health 
insurance programs. It provides states with funds 
both to adopt effective CKF strategies and to add 
new ones. The program developers are build-
ing on the CKF evaluation’s analyses of effective 
activities in the CKF program.
Discussion
CKF offers lessons to funders interested in 
mounting projects to reach and enroll vulnerable 
Americans who are eligible for benefits or ser-
vices provided by various public social programs 
but who are not enrolled. With the passage of 
health care reform legislation, funders will likely 
have numerous opportunities to do outreach to 
newly eligible Americans. Such efforts need not 
be limited to expanding enrollment in health 
insurance programs. Foundations might want to 
seek to increase the number of beneficiaries in 
a range of programs, such as state-funded pre- 
kindergartens, the food stamp program, nurse 
home-visiting programs, and programs that aid 
wounded veterans. Nor do such programs need 
to be national or prolonged to benefit from this 
approach. The lessons drawn from CKF can be 
applied to projects along a continuum of size and 
complexity.
Philanthropic organizations seeking to influence 
the policies and procedures of public agencies, 
rather than to fund a social-services delivery pro-
gram, face distinct challenges. From startup to the 
last stages of a program’s life cycle, such projects 
require a balancing act. Funders must help grant-
ees find a balance between systematically and 
faithfully implementing program strategies and 
retaining the flexibility needed when dealing with 
a government agency subject to changes in politi-
cal and budgetary cycles. Funders must design 
The lessons drawn from CKF can 
be applied to projects along a 
continuum of size and complexity, 
and need not be limited to 
expanding enrollment in health care 
programs.
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and implement projects in such a way that their 
grantees have the wherewithal to deal with these 
inevitable cycles. In the program’s infancy, sites 
should be chosen on the basis of whether they 
exhibit that potential adaptability, so that they 
can pursue other policy or procedural avenues 
when the environment opposes the changes want 
to keep their work moving forward. In its mature 
stage, funders must decide where to place finan-
cial and consulting resources to flexibly support 
grantees coping with the vagaries of working with 
a public agency. Finally, in the end stage of the 
program, funders must be flexible in relinquish-
ing control while working with grantees to build a 
sustainable future to carry on the work. Research, 
analysis, and discussion within the foundation 
community is still needed, however, to devise still 
other ways that funders can build in the flexibility 
needed when trying to influence public policies. 
Programs like CKF expect that their grantees will 
work to influence government policies and proce-
dures, yet they must balance this expectation with 
caution so that grantees will avoid lobbying. CKF 
showed two ways to avoid this. First, CKF demon-
strated that grantees could mitigate old conflicts 
by becoming resources to a state agency, chan-
neling information about the reactions of clients 
and front-line agency personnel to state officials. 
Second, CKF demonstrated that the use of PICs 
could create cooperative relationships, allowing 
grantee representatives and state agency person-
nel to learn to value one another as they work 
to simplify or coordinate eligibility and renewal 
procedures. These two practices can help funders 
and grantees influence positive changes in state 
policies and procedures without direct lobbying. 
One caveat, however; funders must place some 
limits on this cooperation in order to ensure 
that grantees maintain the capacity for objective 
analyses of the situation and avoid “capture” by 
the state agency.
The various ways in which CKF succeeded in 
working with states to increase enrollment and 
retention of low-income children (and some-
times their parents) on the SCHIP and Medicaid 
rolls (Wooldridge et. al., 2010) will hopefully 
inspire funders to address similar issues in other 
social welfare programs. The lessons of dealing 
with uncertainty, building an evidence base, and 
supporting sustainability, among others, could 
support the success of new programs in new areas 
of public policy.
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